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HOW THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISIONS OVER THE LAST 
DECADE HAVE RE-SHAPED FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Katherine E. White* 
In 1982, Congress created the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(Federal Circuit) in order to, inter alia, provide an appellate forum of nationwide 
jurisdiction to improve the administration of patent law through centralizing 
appeals in patent cases.1  Before the forming of the Federal Circuit, patent cases 
were appealed to the regional numbered circuits.  Nationwide uniformity was 
possible only through the U.S. Supreme Court (Supreme Court) intervention in 
resolving conflicts between the circuits.  From 1982 to 1996, the Supreme Court 
appeared to grant the Federal Circuit a honeymoon period to allow the court to 
develop its own law and create uniformity among the circuits.  The honeymoon 
ended in 1996 when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Markman v. 
Westview Instruments.2  After that case was decided, the landscape for the 
Federal Circuit changed.  Since then, the Supreme Court has been increasingly 
granting certiorari in patent cases from the Federal Circuit. 
The Supreme Court is always the most important voice in interpreting the 
laws of the United States.  The Court, however, has more force when it is 
unanimous in its decision-making.  Many of the controversial Supreme Court 
cases discussed in the news are 5 to 4 decisions where any given issue is just one 
Justice away from receiving a majority.  This is not the case in patent cases, 
where the Supreme Court is uniquely united.  In looking at the important patent 
cases the Supreme Court has heard since 1996, seven have been unanimous, with 
two having only one dissenter, and one having two dissenters.3  The only case 
                                                                                                                         
*    Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. 
 1. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.  See also 28 
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2000). 
 2. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Sep. 27, 1995) (No. 
95-26). 
 3. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996) (unanimous) (holding 
claim construction is a matter for the court, not the jury); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis 
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997) (unanimous) (adhering to the doctrine of equivalents); Pfaff v. 
Wells Elecs. Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1998) (unanimous) (creating a general rule for when the on 
sale bar clock begins); J.E.M. Ag Supply Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 145 
(2001) (6 to 2, with Justice O’Connor abstaining) (holding newly discovered plant breeds were 
patentable under the general utility patent statute); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740-41 (2002) (unanimous) (holding prosecution history estoppel is 
appropriately applied under a flexible bar approach instead of a complete bar approach); Illinois 
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep.  Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (unanimous, with Justice Alito taking 
no part in the decision) (holding that the mere fact that a tying product is patented does not support 
a presumption of market power); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006) 
(unanimous) (holding that general principles of equity apply when granting permanent injunctions); 
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with three dissents was based primarily on a procedural issue regarding scope of 
review standards on appeal from Executive Agencies.4  
I.  HOW HAVE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS RE-SHAPED FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT JURISPRUDENCE? 
The cases the Supreme Court has decided over the last decade have re-
shaped Federal Circuit jurisprudence.  The recent Supreme Court opinion in KSR 
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.5 exposes further how the Court is scrutinizing 
Federal Circuit patent law jurisprudence.  In analyzing the aforementioned cases, 
one can discern three principles the Federal Circuit should follow: 
1. Follow Supreme Court precedent first before resorting to creating new 
Federal Circuit law, 
2. The Supreme Court prefers the Federal Circuit to apply rules in a 
flexible, rather than in a rigid manner; and  
3. Where there is vagueness and indefiniteness in applying a rule, clarify 
and define.  
II.  HOW DID THE SUPREME COURT REVEAL THESE PRINCIPLES IN THEIR CASE 
LAW? 
The Supreme Court prefers the Federal Circuit to apply rules flexibly rather 
than applying them too rigidly.  If there is a need for a rigid rule, the Supreme 
Court wants to be the court to come up with it—more on this later.6  The first 
case that foreshadowed the Court’s concern over rigid rules was Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.7  In that case, the petitioner 
challenged whether the doctrine of equivalents survived the changes made in the 
1952 Patent Act.8  The Supreme Court adhered to the doctrine of equivalents, a 
doctrine the Court first approved in 1854.9  The Supreme Court embraced using 
                                                                                                                         
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2007) (8 to 1) (holding a licensee was 
not required to terminate or breach its patent license agreement in order to seek a declaratory 
judgment as to whether patent was invalid or unenforceable); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. 
Ct. 1727, 1739 (2007) (unanimous) (rejecting the rigid and mandatory application of the Teaching-
Suggestion-Motivation to combine test for determining obviousness, in favor of a more flexible 
approach); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1758-59 (2007) (7 to 1, with Chief 
Justice Roberts not participating) (rejecting extraterritorial protection to software manufacturers 
where copies of software were made overseas); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 150 (1999) (6 to 
3) (holding that Board of Patent Appeals and Interference judges are administrative law judges 
whose opinions deserve Administrative Procedure Act court/agency standard of review deference). 
 4. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).   
 5. 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). 
 6. See generally Pfaff v. Wells Elecs. Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998). 
 7. 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 8. Id. at 25 (“Petitioner’s primary argument in this Court is that the doctrine of equivalents, as 
set out in Graver Tank in 1950, did not survive the 1952 revision of the Patent Act . . . .”). 
 9. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 343-44 (1853). 
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different linguistic frameworks in determining the doctrine of equivalents.10  
Rather than choosing between using the triple identity test,11 otherwise known as 
the function-way-result test, or the insubstantial change test,12 the analysis 
should focus more flexibly on the essential question:  “Does the accused product 
or process contain elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of 
the patented invention?”13  The Supreme Court chose to recognize that 
“[d]ifferent linguistic frameworks may be more suitable to different cases, 
depending on their particular facts.”14  Instead of micromanaging, the Supreme 
Court is contented to allow the Federal Circuit to work out the details in 
analyzing how to evaluate subject matter to determine equivalents, while 
applying rules in a flexible way.  The Court did, however, choose to limit the 
Federal Circuit’s application of the doctrine of equivalents through requiring that 
the court apply the doctrine on an “element-by-element basis.”15 
In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,16 the Supreme 
Court admonishes the Federal Circuit for creating a rigid rule that is inconsistent 
with Supreme Court precedent.17  In Festo, the Federal Circuit held that any 
narrowing amendment made for a “reason related to patentability”18 triggered 
prosecution history estoppel such that no range of equivalents was available for 
that amended claim element.19  This we refer to as the complete bar approach.20  
Although the Supreme Court had never applied a complete bar rule to 
prosecution history estoppel, the Federal Circuit viewed the flexible bar 
approach, which allowed some equivalents based on what occurred during 
prosecution, as unworkable.21  The Federal Circuit sought a bright-line rule to 
solve this problem.22  The Supreme Court, however, preferred its own precedent 
and adhered to its flexible bar approach—unworkable or not.23  The Court stated:  
“The [complete bar approach] is inconsistent with the purpose of applying the 
estoppel in the first place—to hold the inventor to the representations made 
                                                                                                                         
 10. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40 (stating “the particular linguistic framework used is less 
important than whether the test is probative of the essential inquiry”). 
 11. Id. at 39. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 40. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.  
 16. 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 17. Id. at 738-39. 
 18. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 563 (Fed.Cir. 
2000).  
 19. Id. at 564. 
 20. See, e.g., id. at 574. 
 21. Id. at 575 (“We believe that the current state of the law regarding the scope of equivalents 
that is available when prosecution history estoppel applies is ‘unworkable’.”). 
 22. See id. at 575 (stating “[i]n patent law, we think that rules qualify as ‘workable’ when they 
can be relied upon to produce consistent results and give rise to a body of law that provides 
guidance to the marketplace on how to conduct its affairs”). 
 23. Festo, 535 U.S. at 737-38. 
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during the application process and to the inferences that may reasonably be 
drawn from the amendment.”24   
The eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.25 case is another that challenges one 
of the Federal Circuit’s rules.  In that case the Federal Circuit applied its 
“general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent 
infringement absent exceptional circumstances.”26  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari specifically to “determine the appropriateness of this general rule.”27  
Once again, the Supreme Court preferred its own precedent to the Federal 
Circuit’s and rejected automatic grants of permanent injunctions to patentees 
upon a finding of patent infringement.28  The Supreme Court viewed the 
principles of equity to be well-established and satisfactory in determining when a 
plaintiff is to receive an injunction.29  Those principles espoused a four-factor 
test steeped in tradition, which has long been recognized as proper.30  According 
to the Supreme Court, casting aside such an entrenched test should not be taken 
lightly.31   
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.32 is the most recent case where the 
Supreme Court rejects a rigid application of a rule.  That case may have changed 
Federal Circuit precedent, but it did not change Supreme Court precedent.  In 
KSR International, the Court clarifies that it favors general and flexible rules to 
determine patentability rather than bright-line rules that are applied rigidly and 
strictly.33  The Supreme Court de-emphasizes the importance the Federal Circuit 
placed on finding a teaching, suggestion, or motivation (TSM) to combine 
references in published scientific literature when analyzing obviousness.34  The 
Court gives stronger weight to motivations driven by market demand and 
techniques that would be obvious to one of ordinary skill, but where there may 
                                                                                                                         
 24. Id. 
 25. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). 
 26. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 27. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 74 
U.S.L.W. 3051 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2005) (No. 05-130). 
 28. eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1841 (holding “the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive 
relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion must be 
exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in other 
cases governed by such standards”). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id at 1839 (setting out the four-factor test) (“A plaintiff must demonstrate:  (1) that it has 
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the 
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not 
be disserved by a permanent injunction.”). 
 31. Id. at 1840-41. 
 32. 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). 
 33. Id. at 1739 (“[Supreme Court] cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach 
inconsistent with the way the [Federal Circuit] applied its [teaching-suggestion-motivation to 
combine] test here.”). 
 34. Id. at 1741 (“The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by . . . an overemphasis on the 
importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.”). 
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be little discussion about them because such methods are common sense.35  The 
Supreme Court adhered to Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,36 its own 
precedent, and rejected how the Federal Circuit changed the obviousness inquiry 
over the years in applying the TSM test.37  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court 
was so enamored with its own precedent that it even brought up those old cases 
the patent bar has long rejected—cases like Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. 
Pavement Salvage Co.,38 Sakraida v. Ag Pro. Inc.,39 and my least favorite case, 
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.40  The 
Supreme Court in Graham stated:   
Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose 
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to 
restrict free access to materials already available.  Innovation, 
advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are 
inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command 
must “promote the Progress of * * * useful Arts.”  This is the standard 
expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.  And it is in 
this light that patent validity “requires reference to a standard written 
into the Constitution.”41  
The Supreme Court in KSR International seems to be trying to clean up these 
cases through citing them only in so far as they are consistent with Graham v. 
John Deere.42 
III.  WHEN DEFINITENESS IS REQUIRED, A CLEAR RULE IS NEEDED 
It is not that the Supreme Court dislikes rigid or general rules, it is just that 
the Court seems to want to resort to such rules only when indefiniteness and 
vagueness are a problem.  And the Supreme Court prefers to be the court that 
creates those rules rather than the Federal Circuit.  We see this in Pfaff v. Wells 
Electronics, Inc.43  In that case, the Supreme Court held that the current standard 
the Federal Circuit used to trigger when the statutory bar clock begins, when an 
invention is “substantially complete,” was too vague and indefinite.44  The 
                                                                                                                         
 35. Id. at 1740-41. 
 36. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
 37. eBay, 127 S. Ct at 1740-41. 
 38. 396 U.S. 57 (1969). 
 39. 425 U.S. 273 (1976). 
 40. 340 U.S. 147 (1950). 
 41. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 (citing Great A. & P. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 154 (concurring 
opinion)). 
 42. See KSR Int’l Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1740 (suggesting that “a court must ask whether the 
improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established 
functions”). 
 43. 525 U.S. 55 (1998). 
 44. Id. at 66 n.11 (stating that the totality of the circumstances test has admittedly been 
criticized as unnecessarily vague). 
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Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Circuit that it is important to know what 
activity will trigger the statutory bar clock running, but a more definite rule was 
needed.45  The Supreme Court employs a general rule having two prongs, where 
the issues are whether (1) the invention is the subject of a commercial offer for 
sale and (2) whether the invention is ready for patenting.46  Thus, this is a 
general rule that the Supreme Court developed to solve an indefiniteness 
problem. 
IV.  HOW DID THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT GET OFF TRACK AND HOW WILL THE 
SUPREME COURT’S DECADE LONG INVOLVEMENT IN PATENT LAW 
JURISPRUDENCE AFFECT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT GOING FORWARD?  
First, how did the Federal Circuit get off track?  When the Federal Circuit 
was formed, it was intended to create national uniformity.47  Giving the Federal 
Circuit national jurisdiction would prevent the problems that occurred prior to 
the court’s inception, where a patent might be valid in one regional circuit but 
not in another.  Before the Federal Circuit’s creation, the Supreme Court was 
forced to step in to handle any disagreements between the circuits.  The idea was 
that the Federal Circuit would eliminate this problem.  The only thing is that the 
Federal Circuit, unlike its predecessor the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 
does not routinely sit en banc, as the Supreme Court sits.  The Federal Circuit 
sits, like the regional circuits, in panels of three.48  This has affected Federal 
Circuit jurisprudence.  Unable to overrule each other, each panel takes a small 
step away from the next, making distinctions from prior cases so as not to 
overrule but to distinguish itself from the previous panels.  In so doing, the 
Federal Circuit may have strayed too far from Supreme Court precedent and in 
trying to create uniformity in developing bright-line rules.  It is clear, however, 
that the Supreme Court is poised to step in when a case is ripe and pull the 
Federal Circuit back to following Supreme Court precedent.   
Perhaps it is the Court’s ruling in KSR International that has signaled where 
the Supreme Court wants the Federal Circuit to go and where it should not tread.  
It is evident from the cases following KSR International that the Federal Circuit 
is trying harder to carefully apply Supreme Court precedent as it was intended.  
The Court’s message has been heard.  A case in point is In re Seagate 
Technology, LLC.49   
                                                                                                                         
 45. Id. at 65-66 (“A rule that makes the timeliness of an application depend on the date when 
an invention is ‘substantially complete’ seriously undermines the interest in certainty.”). 
 46. Id. at 67. 
 47. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.  See also 28 
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2000). 
 48. 28 U.S.C. § 46. 
 49. 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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In that case, the Federal Circuit overruled its own precedent in Underwater 
Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co,50 which set a lower threshold for willful 
infringement than Supreme Court precedent.51  Underwater Devices uses a 
standard akin to a negligence standard that does not “comport with the general 
understanding of willfulness in the civil context.”52  The Federal Circuit 
overruled this precedent in response to a recent Supreme Court case, Safeco 
Insurance Co. of America v. Burr,53 which set forth the meaning of willfulness as 
a statutory condition of civil liability for punitive damages.54  The Federal 
Circuit, in overruling its own precedent, held that “proof of willful infringement 
permitting enhanced damages requires at least a showing of objective 
recklessness.”55  The Supreme Court case Safeco Insurance, setting forth the 
willfulness standard, was completely unrelated to patent law.  The case involved 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which imposes liability for failure to comply with 
its requirements.56  Punitive damages could be recovered for willful violations.57  
The Supreme Court defined willfulness as comporting with its common law 
usage, which includes actions taken in reckless disregard.58  Even though the 
case was unrelated to patent law, when the Federal Circuit had an opportunity to 
extend new Supreme Court precedent to a patent case, it did so.   
V.  PREDICTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Any Federal Circuit precedent that has carved out special rules for treating 
patent cases differently than they would be treated using traditional notions of 
equity is vulnerable to Supreme Court attack.  For example, eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C.59 signals the end of the presumption of irreparable harm 
in preliminary injunction cases upon a clear showing of infringement.60  The 
Supreme Court was clear on its adherence to applying traditional notions of 
                                                                                                                         
 50. 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 51. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370-71 (concluding that the Supreme Court requires the 
“standard civil usage” of “willful” and includes reckless behavior, in contrast to the duty of care set 
forth in Underwater Devices (citing Safeco Ins. Co of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2209 (2007))). 
 52. Id. at 1371. 
 53. 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007). 
 54. Id. at 2208 (stating “where willfulness is a statutory condition of civil liability, we have 
generally taken it to cover not only knowing violations of a standard, but reckless ones as well” 
(citing McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1988))).  
 55. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. 
 56. Safeco, 127 S. Ct. at 2206-07. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 2208. 
 59. 126 S. Ct. 1837. 
 60. See H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(stating “[i]n matters involving patent rights, irreparable harm has been presumed when a clear 
showing has been made of patent validity and infringement” (citing Smith-Int’l Inc. v. Hughes Tool 
Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983))).  
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equitable principles to permanent injunctions.61  It is only logical that these 
principles should also be applied to preliminary injunction grant requests.  
After KSR International, there is an opportunity for the Federal Circuit to 
address issues presented in biotechnology cases in a different way.  Perhaps In re 
Deuel62 will be looked at with an eye towards evaluating what is “obvious to 
try.”  The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (the Board) is already 
beginning to look at this. 
In Ex Parte Kubin,63 the Board addressed whether a claimed nucleotide 
sequence would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art based on a 
prior art reference and the teachings of how to isolate its cDNA using 
conventional techniques.64  The Board found that despite Ex Parte Kubin being 
factually similar to In re Deuel, Kubin would not come out the same way.65  
Since In re Deuel was decided, the Board concluded that the level of skill in the 
field has significantly increased.66  Consequently, In re Deuel would not control 
here.67  The Board suggested the Supreme Court’s opinion in KSR International 
“recently cast doubt on the viability of Deuel to the extent that the Federal 
Circuit rejected an ‘obvious to try’ test.”68  After KSR International, the Board 
stated that the “obvious to try” test may be appropriate “in more situations than 
we previously contemplated.”69  Here the Board held that “[o]ne of ordinary skill 
in the art would have had a reasonable likelihood of success that he or she would 
have been able to obtain the nucleotide...using conventional methods [disclosed 
in the prior art].”70 
Another example of changes to the patent law that might occur in the future 
concerns an interesting case in which the Supreme Court has granted certiorari, 
Quanta Computers v. LG Electronics.71  This case addresses to what extent a 
conditional sale, or at least a sale that is not unconditional, limits the patent 
exhaustion doctrine.72  The patent exhaustion doctrine articulates that, upon a 
valid first sale of a patented product in commerce, either by the patentee or an 
authorized licensee, patent rights to exclude others from using or selling the 
patented product are exhausted.73  The Supreme Court’s precedent treats the 
first-sale patent exhaustion doctrine as delimiting the patentee’s exclusive 
                                                                                                                         
 61. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839. 
 62. 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 63. 2007 WL 2070495 (BPAI, May 31, 2007). 
 64. Id. at *2. 
 65. Id. at *4. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at *5 (citing KSR Int’l, 127 S. Ct at 1742). 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at *4. 
 71. LG Elecs. Inc. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 75 
U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. Sep. 25, 2007) (No. 06-937). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1874). 
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rights.74  The Federal Circuit, however, has applied this doctrine differently.75  It 
has allowed patentees to put express restrictions on re-sale or re-use on a sale, 
thus circumventing the patent exhaustion doctrine.76  The most notable of these 
restrictions is a “single-use only restriction” whereby when a product is sold, 
there is a condition on the sale that the product only be used once.77  The only 
limit on these agreements is that they may not carry price-fixing or tying 
restrictions, as these would be per se illegal under antitrust law.78 
There are two issues that are critical in the Quanta Computers v. LG 
Electronics case.  First, Supreme Court precedent has never categorically held 
that method claims are not subject to the patent exhaustion doctrine.79  Second, 
the Supreme Court has only made distinctions between applying the patent 
exhaustion doctrine when a licensee, who was not authorized to sell, makes a 
sale.80  Thus, the sale is unauthorized and would not fall within the purpose of 
patent exhaustion doctrine.  In other words, suppose patentee grants a licensee 
the right to “license to others the right to use a patented machine,” but not the 
right to sell the machines, or use the machines beyond the expiration of the 
original term of the agreement.81  In that case, when the patentee sought to enjoin 
downstream use of the machine beyond the term of the license, the Supreme 
Court held that the first-sale doctrine did not apply, because the seller was “only 
a licensee and never had any power to sell a machine so as to withdraw it 
indefinitely from the operation of the franchise secured by the patent.”82  
In contrast, the Federal Circuit held in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.83 
that conditional sales may be enforced against downstream purchasers after an 
authorized sale made by the patentee or licensee so long as the restrictions do not 
have anticompetitive effects.  The problem with the Federal Circuit’s analysis is 
that the downstream purchasers are not in privity with any contracts the patentee 
had with the licensee and have no direct contractual dealings with the patentee.  
The only possible way for these restrictions to take hold is if the patent 
exhaustion doctrine does not apply.  The question is should a patentee be able to 
claim patent infringement to enforce a contract restriction on a purchaser’s right 
to use the patent article for its only reasonable intended use?84  This discord 
                                                                                                                         
 74. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7, Quanta 
Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc. (2007) (No. 06-937) [hereinafter Brief for the U.S.]. 
 75. See e.g. Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Medipart Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 708. 
 79. See generally Brief for the U.S, supra note 74, at 13 (citing Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502, 509, 513, 515 (1917)). 
 80. Id. at 13 (citing Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544 (1873)). 
 81. See Mitchell, 83 U.S. at 548. 
 82. Id. at 551. 
 83. 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 84. See Katherine E. White, A Rule for Determining When Patent Misuse Should be Applied, 
11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 671 (Spring 2001). 
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between Supreme Court precedent and Federal Circuit precedent makes the LG 
Electronics case a wonderful opportunity for the Court to clarify the scope of the 
patent exhaustion doctrine. Given that the Supreme Court is fonder of its own 
precedent that of the Federal Circuit, it is likely the Court will step in and right 
the ship just as it had to in cases like Pfaff, KSR International, and Festo.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit was created, inter alia, to improve the administration of 
patent law through centralizing appeals through a court with nationwide 
jurisdiction.  The court, however, has been shifting its precedent away from 
Supreme Court precedent.  Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has been 
increasingly granting certiorari to clarify how patent law is to be interpreted.  In 
analyzing the cases through which the Supreme Court has spoken, it is clear that 
there are three principles the Federal Circuit should follow:  (1) follow Supreme 
Court precedent first before resorting to creating new Federal Circuit law, (2) the 
Supreme Court prefers flexible rules over rigid ones, and (3) where there is 
vagueness, then clarify and define.  
 
                                                                                                                         
 
